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In reference to Heinz von Foerster's "second order cybernetics" I call "2nd order systems theory" a self-referential view in which I describe myself as a system with my systems theory. In this second order I consider myself both as subject and object of my systems theory. With the term 2nd order I am therefore not referring to a theory of theory, as one could understand H. von Foerster's term Cybernetics of Cybernetics, if one considers cybernetics as theory, but rather that I am referring my theory to myself. In reference to Cybernetics of Cybernetics, N. Luhmann speaks of the "society of society". In his notation, society appears as a "system" that describes itself, whereby its person merely fulfils a social (communicative) function as an author, because society cannot write.
In the "2nd order system theory" I do not see any opposing view to 1st order system theory, but only the reflection of a certain implication of system theory: Every system theory originates from an observer, who in turn can be seen as a system. In this context, I refer to systems theories as "first-order systems theory", which hide the observer to the extent that they only represent the "field of vision" of the observer, but not his face. In the first order I see systems that share their environment with me.
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With a system theory I have to express self-referentially what I call system theory and how it fulfils its purpose. To do this, I have to explain what I call systems within the theory, what function these systems have and how they function. The placeholder for these requirements I call black box. As an observer I assign a black box to each phenomenon. With this I express that I cannot know how the phenomenon really comes about, because the black box is by definition not visible. In terms of system theory, I describe possible modes of operation of the black box in the form of constructed mechanisms. And finally I understand myself as the object of my theory, as an observer system. Insofar as I perceive myself as a system, I also talk about myself with systems theory. In this sense, systems theory also serves me for self-perception, but above all for reflecting my perception in general. As an observer system I speak in the same breath about my perception and about my environment. Due to the operational unity of systems I can only perceive my own states, which I can explain to myself by means of an environment. What I perceive as environment reflects me. Only as (external) observer I can perceive systems in their environment and relate the behaviour of the systems to their environment. In 2nd order systems theory I therefore distinguish the perspective of a system observer from the perspective of an observer system (note 1). In "2nd order systems theory" I observe only the system. |
The environment is - system theoretically - determined by the system. Everything that does not belong to the system belongs to its environment, which is hidden in the observation of the system or is perceived as not existing. The biologist H. Maturana, for example, observes the biologically constructed nervous system. What does not belong to the nervous system is the environment of the nervous system. Of course, as an observer I can also choose a system that reacts to signals from an environment surrounding the nervous system. Then I simply observe another system, not the nervous system.
I understand radical constructivism as a consequence of systems theory. When I sit in the black box, the area to be reconstructed is outside the black box. Then I have to say as an observer system - within the framework of this systems theory - that I am constructing my environment. My environment-world is my explanation for the perception of my own states. What I see, I explain to myself with the fact that it is before my eyes, and that I see, I explain to myself with the fact that I have eyes. Both the environment of the eyes and the eyes are constructions. It is a double contingency in which the environment and the eye appear structurally coupled, because a differently constructed system would perhaps construct a different environment in which other systems would then occur (note 2).
When another person explains the behaviour of a computer, I call this person an observer of the computer. I then call myself an observer of this person and the computer. In 1st order systems theory, I thematize what an observer perceives. I am talking, for example, about the computer or about how an observer describes the computer. In first-order systems theory, I speak objectively about objects that I can perceive as independent of myself. In the 1st order I speak about what I perceive, not about how I perceive.
In first-order systems theory, the world appears to me to be independent of the observer. In first-order systems theory, "I" formulations are meaningless, because the point is to record the observations that every observer should perceive in the same way. If there is any mention of the observer at all, he is the scientist or author who must report "true", which is the case independently of him.
The 1st order systems theory thus corresponds to the conventional understanding of science, which is suspended in radical constructivism.
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