1.

G. Spencer-Brown writes: "We take for granted the idea of distinction and the idea of designation, and that we cannot make a designation without making a distinction" (LoF:1).

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2.

In the language of object-oriented programming, a further distinction is made: Attributes are what is commonly called a property. The attributes of a class determine what the instances of the class do when its internal state changes or when the instance is requested to do something by another class or object.
Properties determine what objects can do and what you can do with objects. To pick up the theoretical class Motorcycle again, there are some properties this class could have:
- start engine
- turn engine off
- accelerate
- shift,
- brake.
That you can start a motor (object) is a property of the motor. That it has 4 cylinders is an attribute of the engine. "Start" is a method.

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3.

In sociological systems theory (the school around N. Luhmann) - in a respecification of the calculus by G. Spencer-Brown - entities are not used. Of course, communication can communicate "red" without talking about something red: A says "red", B asks "what red? A replies "simply red". Sociologically speaking, this is a form of communication, but it is not described. Of course, this also means that sociological systems theorists use a narrower - or rather more formal - concept of observation. With N. Luhmann, observation is manifested in naming, not in describing.

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4.

Of course an entity does not have to have a sensual equivalent, I can also attribute a characteristic to a unicorn. And above all I can of course also say which characteristic I do not attribute to an entity. And so I can also describe what I do not perceive or cannot perceive.

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5.

I do not want to estimate whether everything that can be said can be written. But as a description I only refer to everything that can be written.

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