1.

I know only a few nonfiction texts that are written in the I-form. The ego-form makes me aware of fiction. That E. von Glasersfeld, for example, used the I-form - although not radically - in his book Radical Constructivism, I associate it with the subject-dependence of all knowledge postulated in the book. One can help oneself with a "we" or "one" that includes the readers, which I can find in many non-fiction texts. In radical dialogue, I refrain from incorporating you into my fiction. I say conjuctively what I think "one" could do or see (variation) and indicatively what I perceive (selection). Every dialogue helps me to enlarge the variation and to make me aware of my selection.

N. Luhmann has presented a "system-theoretical solution" for the avoidance of subjective knowledge. His "social communication systems" are institutions and societies that do not consist of people, but of communications in which people quasi function as carrier material. These communications of a society include, in particular, descriptions of society, including those written by N. Luhmann as a medium of society. Therefore, N. Luhmann can write that society describes itself. Of course, it does not do this in the ego form, because it describes itself through the media. God and society speak, so to speak, through authorized governors who call themselves authors. I find the procedure "it writes through me" in the centre of all esotericism.

2.

For example, when I speak of N. Wieners or N. Luhmann's systems theory, I don't mean that a certain systems theory belongs to them, but that they represent - tautologically - a certain view of systems theory. Of course I do not know what N. Wiener or N. Luhmann thought or meant, I only know how to interpret their texts. With such attributions I am therefore not concerned with persons, but with describing different views of systems theory (variation) by saying in whose texts I read which views (selection). I see the present systems theory as a "cybernetic" systems theory. With "cybernetic" I also characterize a lot of views that seem related to me. When N. Luhmann writes about "older, cybernetic system theories", for example, I read in this sense that he wants to delimit his "sociological" system theory - which, in his eyes, is not a cybernetic system theory - conceptually, while N. Wiener, who coined the term cybernetics, apparently wanted to designate his own family within system theory, perhaps because the term "system theory" already seemed to him to have a different meaning.

3.

Of course, science - and I do - can also be understood as completely undogmatic and dialogical. Then, however, it does not work with guiding distinctions like right/wrong (N. Luhmann) or falsified/not falsified (K. Popper), but reports on interesting experiments that could perhaps be comprehended. Nothing becomes true or right, and with experiments I can only falsify my ideas about how the experiments should go. One scientific experiment that I like very much is the reconstruction of I. Pawlow's experiments for conditioning dogs. I will go into that.