| Hypercommunication - Crash Courses - Second-order Systems Theory [ Hyper-Library ] [ Hyper-Lexicon ] [ back ] |
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As designation I refer to the assignment of a symbol to an entity, which I produce through a distinction. When I distinguish red and green, I refer to the two sides of the distinction by the symbols "red" and "green" (note 1). When I label in writing, I use artifacts that I call expressions, where "expression" is a designation of the very entity that I use when I label in writing. "red" is then a term that functions as a symbol, which I assign to an entity. And entity in this case I call what is red - here a certain part of the "screen", which I could also call a spot or a figure. |
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The mapping I make when I label implies a duplication, which I call coding (note 2). Each different one is assigned a designation which is different from other designations, the expressions "red" and "green" are as different as red and green (note 3).
As an interpretive observer I refer to objects that I perceive in my environment. To stick with my previous examples, I refer to a combine harvester, a yacht, a weaver or an oil heater. And I designate properties by which I characterize objects, which means that I determine them by assigning properties. The combine harvester, for example, is red, heavy and expensive. As an interpretive observer I live in a language that allows me to assign expressions to referenced objects or states. I can - in a certain respect - agree on the assignment by showing what I designate (note 4). Of course, I do not have to show myself what I assign to my expressions, and my dog, who looks at my index finger instead of what I point to, shows me that my pointing does not work easily for others. And certainly I don't want to justify a language about such agreements. Rather, I use language when I make such assignments by learning under which pragmatic conditions I can say "red" or "green" (note 5).
The distinction between labeling and distinguishing is based on the fact that I can label an entity produced by distinction differently (arbitrarily). In the sociological systems theory of N. Luhmann, distinction and designation are understood as a formal operation that is the basis of all communication. In the formalism used there, the two aspects necessarily belong together, while here entities can also be distinguished by sorting without designation. I can put red and green balls in different bowls without designating them. Only I cannot communicate without designations.
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